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INTRODUCTION 
he balancing in contract law that allows for economic efficiency 
while providing minimum policing of abuses has become 
lopsided in recent years. When adhesive contracts were granted 
legitimacy, courts assumed that certain boundaries would keep their 
dangers in check; unfortunately, those boundaries have since eroded. 
Contract law emerged when parties dickered over individual terms. 
Technology, beginning with moveable type and then rapid presses, 
introduced changes in practice and gradual dilutions of theory. 
The experience and the consequences of adhesive contracting have 
changed over time, but never more dramatically than since the digital 
revolution.2 As businesses have moved into the online marketplace, 
the temptation to bind customers to lengthier agreements than would 
have been practicable in the real world has become all too 
compelling.3 The advent of the online marketplace has brought with it 
Terms of Service, Terms of Use, End User License Agreements, 
Terms and Conditions, Return and Privacy Policies, and so forth 
(hereinafter “online contracts”). 
Significant legal thinkers, especially Karl Llewellyn, conceded the 
usefulness of adhesion contracts but demanded they be kept within 
limits. These boundaries, including unconscionability, good faith, and 
unarticulated judicial discretion, have largely fallen victim to the law 
and economics movement. Judges rarely use them as tools to effect 
justice, fearing that it will earn them the label “activist.” The balance 
has been lost as consumer protection principles have decayed and the 
use of adhesion contracts has exploded. 
                                                     
2 Contracting has not changed, however, for Eli’s grandpa, who is convinced that he 
will be abducted by the government within twenty-four hours of allowing a computer into 
his home. 
3 For further discussion of how online contracts vary from real world contracts, see 
infra Part I. 
T 
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In 1919 an American law review author was the first to use the 
phrase “contracts of ‘adhesion.’”4 Little did he realize his legacy 
when he suggested that “[t]his expressive term seems worthy of a 
place in our legal vocabulary.”5 A particularly insightful article later 
traced the phrase: 
“contrat d’adhésion” . . . to describe those so-called contracts “in 
which one predominant unilateral will dictates its law to an 
undetermined multitude . . . which, as the Romans said, resemble[s] 
a law much more than a meeting of the minds.” In France, the need 
for the distinct treatment of such contracts was recognized by the 
legislature as early as 1757.6 
Part I of this article discusses the dangers of adhesion contracts, 
particularly in the online context, where they are most susceptible to 
abuse. In Part II, we discuss foundational contract principles, 
specifically the transition from feudalism to freedom of contract and 
the dramatic shift in the meaning of “freedom of contract” over time. 
We begin Part III with a conceptual exploration of how to define an 
adhesion contract. We then discuss the history of adhesion 
contracting, from early posted notices and over a century of judicial 
fracas about whether and when to enforce contract terms printed on 
tickets, bills of lading, receipts, and so forth. We describe how a field 
of law based on the freedom of the serfs and knowing choice 
developed to pre-printed, non-negotiable, universal terms on a form 
accepted by implication. In Part IV, we continue with the 
developments of the twentieth century, marked by the promulgation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, and consumer protection efforts of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Part V describes the erosion of the unconscionability doctrine, the 
need for knowing assent, notice, and other boundaries in which 
adhesion contracts were contained. We discuss the consequence of the 
resulting imbalance and whether the economic benefits analysis 
justifies the cost. Part VI returns to feudalism and freedom of contract 
to illustrate the need to rethink the enforcement of online contracts. 
                                                     
4 Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 
222 (1919). 
5 Id. at 222 n.106 (citing A. FOUILLÉE ET AL., MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
472, 477 (1916)); 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW § 972 (1912); 1 
OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 532, 533 (Robert Jennings, QC & Arthur Watts, 
KCMG QC eds., 2d ed. 1912)). 
6 Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1072, 1075 n.17 (1953) (citing RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA DÉCLARATION DE 
VOLONTÉ (1901)). 
PRESTON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2012  2:17 PM 
132 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 129 
We conclude that the claim of economic benefits has been allowed to 
swallow the whole of contract values and that some return to balance 
is essential. 
A simple allegory illustrates the need for balance in the use of 
adhesion contracts and the risk if the pendulum swings too far one 
way or the other. Traditional wisdom was once that “you should never 
give a horse straight alfalfa.”7 But modern agricultural nutritionists 
bust this myth, relying on empirical data to show that feeding straight 
alfalfa is in fact not harmful to the horse.8 This advice is only half of 
the equation, however. “Alfalfa should be limit-fed—fed in a fixed 
amount—rather than offered free-choice.”9 Alfalfa is a good thing, 
within bounds. Because it is so rich, a horse that eats too much alfalfa 
becomes fat, gassy, and may die.10 
Similarly, many principles in law are true, but only within limits or 
only set in balance with other principles. This balance was foremost 
in the mind of Karl Llewellyn, one of the most brilliant minds in the 
development of modern commercial law, when he envisioned a legal 
system that would allow adhesive contracts. “[I]n a case-law system, 
the judge[s must] see that the block to which you are indeed assenting 
as a transaction is carved into some approximation of decent balance 
in its detail.”11 
Contract law is now facing a crisis of theory that requires us to 
consider how far the balance has been lost and how it must be 
restored. Contractual liability imposed without knowing assent, with 
burdensome terms, and without an opportunity to negotiate was 
anathema to traditional contract law. Over time, courts and 
commentators recognized the benefits of enforcing standard form 
adhesion contracts, subject to the balancing and bounding afforded by 
other contract doctrines and exercises of judicial discretion. Now the 
benefits of adhesion are being over-emphasized and the caveats about 
being limit-fed are being lost. 
Adhesion—the alfalfa of contract law—is being consumed, 
seemingly without memory of the risks associated with its unbounded 
                                                     
7 Lori K. Warren, Ph.D, P.A.S., Horse Feeding Myths and Misconceptions, ALBERTA 
AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT, http://distanceriding.org/index.php 
?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=53 (last visited July 20, 2012). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. (emphasis in original). 
10 Id. 
11 Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 n.7 (1939) (emphasis 
omitted) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Book Review]. 
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use. In law, the result is that the rich get all the more fat and gassy. In 
short, this Article is about how we ended up stuck with surprisingly 
onerous online contracts12 and an idea of how to get unstuck. 
This Article first reviews the nature of sticky online contracts in 
comparison to historical adhesion paper contracts. It then posits the 
current state of adhesion contract practices in their historical and 
theoretical context. We do not attempt to construct a detailed picture 
of three centuries of contract thinking, but we do condense an 
overview of the history of adhesion contracts through the changing 
tides of economic policy, contract law, and technology marketing. We 
also explain that the balance upon which adhesion contracts were 
originally justified is not honored by modern contract law. 
We propose that, while contracts of adhesion are here to stay, the 
protective principles that originally accompanied their acceptance 
should still be considered a condition of their use. This is particularly 
true in cyber-contracting, where contracts of adhesion grow 
malignantly. While we have been sleeping for half a century, the 
fundamental principle of choice in contract law and the balanced 
wisdom of the Realists13 has been lost, co-opted by commercial 
dynasties that have simply replaced the oppression of the King with 
the oppression of an economic superior bargaining power. 
Cyberspace, instead of being free, open, and liberating,14 is emerging 
as a feudal system controlled by contract.15 
I 
ADHESIVE ONLINE CONTRACTS: MORE DANGEROUS THAN LICKING 
CHEAP ENVELOPES 
Adhesive, preprinted contracts supplied by repeat players in the 
market are extremely convenient, time-efficient, and cost-effective for 
the parties who have the power to choose.16 For this reason, 
                                                     
12 If you doubt this claim, we suspect you are a compulsive clicker and just have not 
read enough of them. See infra Part I. 
13 See infra Part IV.  
14 For a discussion of how the wild-west metaphor for cyberspace has been false and 
dangerous, see Cheryl B. Preston, Internet and Pornography: What If Congress and the 
Supreme Court Had Been Comprised of Techies in 1995-1997?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
61 [hereinafter Preston, Internet and Pornography].  
15 See Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and 
Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207 (2002). 
16 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–33 (1971) (explaining how standard form 
contracts were quickly perceived to be efficient and cost-effective, especially as mass-
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“[s]tandard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-
nine percent of all the contracts now made.”17 Standard form 
contracts are the norm across industries.18 
While the effects of adhesion contracts are similar in the online 
context to traditional paper contracting in terms of non-negotiability, 
the use of adhesion contracts online is more alarming. We have 
discussed at length elsewhere the particular issues arising with online 
contracts, for instance: (1) lack of effective notice and of clearly 
demonstrated assent; (2) unlimited space that permits extraordinary 
length and complexity of terms; (3) extreme provisions and waiver, 
inserted with the knowledge that users will not read them; (4) lack of 
ordinary precautions associated with seeing the length and format of a 
contract before attaching a signature; (5) use in a context marked with 
speed and instant gratification; and (6) vast number of contract-based 
transactions in ordinary daily activities.19 Further discussion of these 
particulars is unnecessary in this Article. Thus, we only provide a 
brief summary. 
Adhesion contracting was old news by the time the Internet rolled 
into homes across America.20 From the moment the first tech-savvy 
innovators realized they could conduct business online, adhesion 
contracts became available in electronic form.21 Perhaps 
unexpectedly, the Internet then became somewhat of a catalyst to the 
problems caused by adhesion contracting. Drafters of adhesive 
contracts who placed their take-it-or-leave-it terms online no longer 
had some of the same boundaries and incentives that provided 
practical limitations on adhesion contracts in the traditional 
contracting context.22 
                                                                                                                 
production became the norm); see also Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 747 (2002) (claiming that the savings from using standard form 
contracts may be passed along to consumers). 
17 Slawson, supra note 16, at 529. 
18 See Friedrich Kessler’s oft-cited article, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (discussing the convenience 
that drives the use of standard form contracts and the problems created by eliminating the 
negotiation process and changing the assent analysis).  
19 See Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps, and 
Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the Horse, 26 
BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 16 (2011). 
20 See id. (discussing the use of adhesion contracts online and examining specific 
examples). 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 27. 
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Adhesion contracts online are typically clickwraps or 
browsewraps. Clickwrap contracts purport to bind consumers by 
merely clicking. Although most clicks are required on a button near 
words mentioning the online contract and containing some version of 
“I accept,” many are not. One common variant is where a site asks the 
user to click to establish an account while explaining in the online 
contract located elsewhere that forming an account constitutes 
acceptance of the contract terms.23 
More egregious are browsewraps. Some very commonly used 
email, retail, and social networking sites contain phrases in their 
online contracts that claim that the consumer is bound merely by 
perusing the site’s products and services.24 Moreover, some websites 
tuck the contracts with this statement in unlikely places and thus give 
no effective notice of the legal consequences of browsing the site. 
Some courts dismiss the problem of notice and suggest that every user 
should assume that contracts form with the use of a webpages and so 
additional notice or clicking is not necessary.25 
Furthermore, there is no longer an economic or psychological 
incentive for drafters to keep contracts length to a minimum.26 Where 
consumers might have balked at 5,000 words printed out over a thick 
packet of contract pages, these same consumers do not have the 
cautionary experience of feeling the weight and thickness of the 
contract in their hands when presented with a tiny hyperlink that leads 
to terms,27 nor do they have the ritual of signing to impress upon 
them the legal significance of their choice. Not only will few follow 
the link to an online contract, fewer still will scroll down to the 
                                                     
23 See id. at 19–22 (examining eight common online service providers and explaining 
the ways in which each purports to bind consumers to their online contracts). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 30 (“[T]here is an obvious and dramatic trend for courts to agree that people 
should generally be aware that [Terms of Service] exist and therefore everyone has 
‘constructive’ notice that terms are there somewhere.”); see also Register.com, Inc., v. 
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2nd Cir. 2004) (rejecting customers’ claim that they lacked 
notice of online browsewrap terms because using the page several times was enough to be 
on notice that terms existed). 
26 See Preston & McCann, supra note 19 (explaining what pushed early contract 
drafters toward brevity and how those initial motivations do not exist in electronic 
contracting); Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 225, 259 (2012) 
(explaining some of the psychological effects of signing a contract on paper compared to 
accepting one electronically). 
27 See Preston & McCann, supra note 19 (describing drafter cognizance of the 
psychological effects of handling a bulky contract); see also Preston, supra note 26, at 254 
(discussing how online contracts pose new problems, in part because of the length of these 
contracts). 
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bottom or count the page equivalents.28 Add to that the lack of face-
to-face interaction between consumer and contract presenter,29 and no 
ability to drive to an established local business where a clerk can be 
found to whom to complain, once a problem has arisen. As we 
explain: 
Consumers are entering into contracts on such a regular basis that it 
is no longer a significant event to assent to an agreement, as it may 
have been before products and services became so available through 
the Internet. And beyond the sheer number of contracts, the lack of 
formalities in contract acceptance online further strip the consumer 
of awareness she may have had in traditional paper contracting 
where the parties might drive to a meeting-place, thumb through 
documents, and apply a physical signature. Rather, with online 
contracting, the consumer can sit at her computer in her sweats and 
immediately begin using online services by merely clicking a 
button. Little time or effort is involved during which a customer 
might reconsider. Even if she did take the time and effort to read 
through the agreement, she does not have much chance of finding 
someone who can explain it and less chance of negotiating any 
changes.30 
Because consumers do not find or read online contracts,31 
particularly egregious terms seem to go unnoticed. Common now in 
online contracts are unilateral modification clauses; some permit the 
drafter to add or change terms at will without notice.32 Some suggest 
the user is responsible for reading the terms with each use, and thus 
proceeding to use the page is a manifestation of assent to whatever 
version of the terms is included. 
Jury waiver, venue restrictions, and arbitration clauses are also 
standard in many online contracts.33 Many include a transfer of 
intellectual property rights.34 For instance, Facebook’s user 
agreement requires the user to grant “a non-exclusive, transferable, 
                                                     
28 See Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 18, 27 (discussing the common consensus 
that drafters often do not take steps to encourage consumers to actually read their 
contracts, and consumers in turn do not bother). 
29 See Preston, supra note 26, at 259–62 (noting the ways in which face-to-face 
negotiating affects the consciousness of contract acceptance). 
30 Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 27–28. 
31 See id. (discussing the regularity with which consumers click to accept without 
actually viewing the online contract). 
32 Id. at 23–25 (considering a few examples of modification clauses in common online 
contracts and briefly discussing their effect). 
33
 Id. at 25 (considering examples of each of these in common online contracts); 
Preston, supra note 26, at 263. 
34 Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 26–27; Preston, supra note 26, at 264 (offering 
a number of examples of these in common online contracts). 
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sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content 
that you post on or in connection with Facebook.”35 Online contracts 
contain unreasonably broad waivers,36 and sometimes two or three 
versions of waivers in the same contract.37 And why not? The space 
on a website is endless. 
Although courts expressed some concern a decade ago, they now 
generally assume the validity of clickwraps without inquiry and also 
tend toward enforcing browsewraps regardless of their length, notice, 
or content.38 Rather than scrutinize formation or even notice, opinions 
include pronouncements that clickwrap agreements “are valid and 
enforceable contracts”39 or “are ubiquitous and have been 
consistently upheld by courts.”40 
What follows is an overview of the development of contract law, 
from formation to its current state. This context illustrates that the 
                                                     
35 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, INC., ¶ 2.1, 
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited July 20, 2012). 
36 See Preston, supra note 26, at 264-65.  
37 See, e.g., Terms of License for PDF Annotator, Conditions of Use, GRAHL 
SOFTWARE DESIGN (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.ograhl.com/pdfannotator/std/en 
/License.txt (“To the maximum extent permitted by applicable law, Grahl . . . disclaims all 
warranties . . . .”); AMAZON.COM (Aug. 19, 2011), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help 
/customer/display.html/ref=footer_cou?ie=UTF8&nodeId=508088 (“To the full extent 
permissible by applicable law, Amazon disclaims all warranties . . . .”). Amazon’s 2,628-
word, five-page, single-spaced Conditions of Use is a browsewrap that purports to be 
binding “[i]f you visit or shop at Amazon.com.” Id. (emphasis added). 
38 See Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 29 (noting a number of cases that 
recognize this trend). 
39 Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet Commc’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463(CM)(GWG), 
2011 WL 744732, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011) (citing Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 741 
N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)) (holding that because the customer could not 
have proceeded to use software without clicking to accept terms, the customer did, in fact, 
accept the terms); see also, e.g., Segal v. Amazon.com, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1369 
(S.D. Fla. 2011) (quoting Salco Distribs., LLC v. iCode, Inc., No. 8:05 CV 642 T 27TGW, 
2006 WL 449156, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006)) (“‘In Florida and the federal 
circuits . . . clickwrap agreements are valid and enforceable contracts.’”).  
40 Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., No. 3:10-CV-957 JCH, 2011 WL 797505, at *6 n.8 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 24, 2011) (citation omitted); see also Smallwood v. NCsoft Corp., 730 F. 
Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D. Haw. 2010) (citing a number of cases to show that most courts 
find clickwrap agreements to be enforceable); Meier v. Midwest Recreational 
Clearinghouse, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-01026-MCE-GGH, 2010 WL 2738921, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 
July 12, 2010) (noting that forum selection clause was not invalid simply because it was 
part of a clickwrap agreement); Exceptional Urgent Care Ctr. I, Inc. v. Protomed Med. 
Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:08-cv-284-Oc-10GRJ, 2009 WL 1370818, at *10 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 
2009) (“There is also no dispute over the validity of clickwrap agreements . . . .”); Jackson 
v. Am. Plaza Corp., No. 08 Civ. 8980 (PKC), 2009 WL 1158829, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 
2009) (arguing that courts no longer seriously dispute the enforceability of clickwrap 
agreements). 
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acceptance of adhesion contracts—notwithstanding the violence done 
to contract doctrine—was predicated on the existence of parameters 
and policing options to constrain abuses. 
II 
BIRTHING CONTRACTIONS OF CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES 
Initially, freedom of contract was the right of weaker parties to 
autonomy from those who would overreach.41 At the time, the 
powerful and overreaching party was the crown, the lord of the 
manor, or the unfettered judiciary who could unilaterally lay down the 
law. Then, the status of a man as a serf, for instance, governed the 
range of his actions. The “freedom of contract” notion was a step 
away from status limitations toward choice. In theory, people could 
choose which duties and obligations they wished to assume in 
exchange for benefits, rather than being born into a fixed relationship 
of rights and obligations. The aspiration was that “men of full age and 
competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall 
be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of justice.”42 
The ability of every man43 to control his life by choosing when to 
enter a contract “flattered the sense of individual self-sufficiency 
which was so large a part of the sense of freedom.”44 “Men ought to 
be bound only when they deliberately chose to be and to the extent 
that they chose.”45 This freedom of contract became a lofty statement 
of core contract values. 
The freedom to contract arose in response to feudal lords’ 
exploitation of serfs despite superficial grants of land benefits.46 
                                                     
41 See Kessler, supra note 18, at 636 (arguing that early contract doctrines, such as 
freedom of contract, sought to protect weak parties from overreaching by economically 
stable repeat players who could craft grossly one-sided terms and enforce them against the 
weaker party). 
42 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R. Eq. 462 (Ch.) 
465 (Sir G. Jessel M.R.).  
43 And in those days they meant “man.” 
44 Max Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 COLUM L. REV. 575, 576 
(1943). 
45 Id. 
46 Yen, supra note 15, at 1235–36 (citing DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 98 (1999)); see also Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an 
Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 643 
(2000). The generalization of feudalism is subject to exceptions, but the quintessential 
aspects of feudalism used for this discussion are widely accepted. See id.; Richard J. 
Lazarus, Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual Through the 
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Because of functional requirements of time and space, manor lords 
had extreme discretion over their manors and the ability to act with 
relative impunity.47 Thus, the king’s justice was largely theoretical; 
lords dispensed the law with little to no kingly oversight.48 The 
agreement between manor lord and serf, contrary to the fealty 
agreement between lord and king, was general, extensive, and open-
ended.49 With the lord keeping the most fertile land, he may have 
allocated land to his serfs, but these land grants were more like a 
chain than a boon.50 The benefits of this agreement were allocated 
unfairly, with the lord enjoying bounty at the serf’s expense.51 This 
one-sided relationship created a clear division of haves and have-nots. 
If serfs were able to escape to neighboring manors, they would still be 
serfs.52 
Over time, the meaning of freedom of contract changed. In 1937 in 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the U.S. Supreme Court explained 
that the power to abridge the freedom of contract “could only be 
justified by the existence of exceptional circumstances.”53 At the 
time, the concept of “freedom of contract” focused on giving parties a 
choice to enter contracts or not.54 The principle transformed from a 
celebration of individual choice and empowerment in creating a 
contract into the assumption that courts should enforce contracts 
imposed without choice.55 This leap from creation to enforcement 
may seem superficial, but it is not. The principle moves from abstract 
                                                                                                                 
Collective Pursuit of Environmental Equality, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1739 (1992); Douglass C. 
North & Robert Paul Thomas, A Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical 
Model, 31 J. ECON. HIST. 771 (1971). 
47 Yen, supra note 15, at 1234. Limits on the lord were explicit and specific, defined 
when swearing fealty. Id. 
48 See id. at 1234 (explaining that delegation of “judicial, police and regulatory powers” 
became necessary “as a matter of practical necessity”). 
49 Id. at 1235. 
50 The serf became “tied to the soil” and was required to stay the property of the manor 
even if there was a change in lords. Id. at 1236. 
51 The lord’s land was tended first. If the serf had time to tend to his land, his crop was 
taxed as well. Id. at 1235. 
52 Id. at 1236. 
53 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406 (1937). 
54
 See id. at 406–07 (explaining that there were specific exceptions where the Court 
“from time to time had upheld statutory interferences with the liberty of contract”). 
55
 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (quoting Nat’l 
Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (explaining that a clause or contract where “parties . . . agree in advance to submit 
to the jurisdiction of a given court . . . or even to waive notice altogether” is enforceable at 
least in part because “[i]t accords with ancient concepts of freedom of contract”). 
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analysis of possible contracts into validating actual contracts, even if 
they would not qualify as contracts when the principle emerged.56 
Arguably, this new freedom of contract is at odds with protective 
doctrines like duress and unconscionability. It urges enforcement 
unless abridged by “the existence of exceptional circumstances.”57 
Further, this new freedom of contract entered the game with a strong 
backing of constitutional connection and free market appeal. 
Ironically, freedom of contract has undergone a diametric shift to 
reinstate the original status-based power. Freedom of contract is used 
to justify the enforcement of a myriad of contract terms that the 
weaker party could not have comprehended or negotiated.58 Although 
couched in terms of allowing individuals to enter “bad deals,” 
freedom of contract, or today’s right of the powerful to privatize law, 
has become an argument that the powerful ought to be free to exercise 
their power without interference from others.59 
Through expansion of freedom of contract, the U.S. Supreme Court 
opened the door for feudalistic contracting.60 Adhesive contracts, 
without proper limitations, behave much like the manorial system 
back in feudal England. In the adhesive contract context, corporate 
lords and consumer serfs are simply fulfilling their manorial system 
roles with little oversight or restriction from the king. Acting as the 
modern-day king, the Court seems to grant considerable discretion to 
corporate lords in drafting adhesive contracts, citing the functional 
requirements of mass consumer contracting and economic benefits as 
its justification.61 And corporate lords appear to draft with relative 
impunity.62 
                                                     
56 The Court explained that the clause was prima facie enforceable “absent some 
compelling and countervailing reason.” Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. Interestingly, this 
language mirrors the language in West Coast Hotel requiring exceptional circumstances. 
The Bremen Court mentions “fraud, undue influence, [and] overweening bargaining 
power,” passing over them brusquely and not mentioning how important they are and 
exactly what role each may play. Id.  
57 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 406. 
58 See Kessler, supra note 18, at 635 (discussing the idea that doctrines developed to 
protect weaker parties from overreaching). 
59 See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build it, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the 
Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 595–96, 638 
(2007) (discussing the “new” freedom of contract and its implication on private ordering, 
especially in relation to arbitration agreements). 
60 See infra Part VI for further discussion of the feudalism analogy. 
61 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (noting the 
economic benefits of mass form contracting); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 
F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining the economic considerations alleged to 
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The corporate lords maintain the best provisions and hold general 
and extensive waivers over the consumer serfs. These agreements 
clearly allocate benefits unfairly, giving corporate lords protections 
and benefits at the consumer serfs’ expense. Even perceived 
consumer benefits act against the consumer, as corporations attempt 
to draft in modest concessions in the hope that they will mollify 
consumer objections to the remaining provisions.63 Here, one-sided 
contracts create protective haves and have-nots. Much like serfs 
unable to escape the manorial system, consumer serfs are stuck with 
terms of service and other adhesive contracts—at least if they want to 
consume anything. 
Additionally, the corporate lords dictate the terms and the 
consumer serfs are at their mercy.64 Judge Richard Posner argues that 
this dynamic likely leads to efficient outcomes because corporations 
will not take advantage of unbalanced terms fearing reputational 
costs.65 Now, with efficiency as the rationalization, it appears that 
consumers are at the mercy of drafters, facing imbalanced terms on 
paper, with discretionary enforcement squarely at the option of the 
corporate lord.66 
Further, the new freedom of contract condones this dynamic by 
relying on the presumption that any such consumer is free to make a 
bad deal. But what do we mean by “deal”? Simply put, one-sided 
                                                                                                                 
justify the use of adhesion contracts); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th 
Cir. 1996); Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 11–12. 
62
 See infra Part VI. 
63 For example, AT&T asked the U.S. Supreme Court to deny granting certiorari on a 
case involving its consumer contracts because AT&T intended to introduce more 
consumer-friendly terms into its next generation of contracts. Brief of AT&T Mobility 
LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 
U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976), 2008 WL 534808, at *19-21; see also Frank 
Blechschmidt, All Alone in Arbitration: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the 
Substantive Impact of Class Action Waivers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 563 (2012); Aaron 
Bruhl, AT&T’s Long Game on Unconscionability, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 2011, 9:40 
AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/05/atts-long-game-on-
unconscionability.html. 
64 See Yen, supra note 15, at 1254 (“Enforcement of adhesion contracts between 
cyberlords and cyberserfs is another example of how the feudalism metaphor might affect 
the application of law to cyberspace.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-
Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (arguing 
that opportunistic behavior of the seller will be dissuaded by reputational considerations, 
that one-sided contracts allow for the seller to be discretionary, and that despite unfair 
terms on paper, the contract will be “implemented in a balanced way”). 
65 Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 64, at 828. 
66
 Id. 
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consumer contracts combined with the new freedom of contract are 
dangerous.67 
III 
FROM AGREEMENT TO ADHESION 
Today’s courts faced with online contracts generally claim to apply 
traditional justifications and principles that supported pre-technology 
contracts.68 Some courts recognize how new applications weaken 
these principles.69 Some acknowledge the doctrines that were 
intended to balance the adoption of adhesive contracts and refer to 
consumer protection principles, such as unconscionability.70 But, 
outside of the mandatory arbitration context, almost no courts 
invalidate online contracts on these grounds. 
A. Conceptual Definitions of Adhesion in Contract Law 
The designation “adhesion” may not have been used until 
commentators began to criticize the practice, but the existence of 
contracts of adhesion is much older. Contracts where one party 
assents because there is no other reasonable choice always coexists 
with power disparities. Parties may have signed, sealed, and sworn in 
front of witnesses their agreement to certain contract terms as a result 
of various life exigencies, or express or implied duress, however 
subtle. 
                                                     
67 The U.S. Supreme Court first expanded the freedom of contract in cases involving 
savvy businesses. See Noyes, supra note 59. Later, it was expanded to apply to consumers, 
even in contracts in which formation purportedly occurred before the terms were available. 
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
68 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 33 (2002) (noting that Hill and 
Brower, two cases discussing “terms later” or  “rolling” contracts where acceptance 
happens before the terms are revealed, “do not differ markedly from the cases involving 
traditional paper contracting”); see also Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (“To determine whether a clickwrap agreement is enforceable, courts 
presented with the issue apply traditional principles of contract law and focus on whether 
the plaintiffs had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the clickwrap 
agreement.”). 
69 See infra Part IV (Llewellyn discussing the importance of maintaining strong 
protections like unconscionability when allowing standard form contracts to be 
enforceable); Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Marketing Group, Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 812 
(2009) (“[W]hen courts try to pour new wine into old legal bottles, we sometimes miss the 
nuances.”). 
70 See infra notes 224–26 (citing cases discussing unconscionability concerns with 
online contracts). 
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Being compelled to accept a contract because of unfortunate 
circumstances beyond a party’s control, however, does not make a 
contract adhesive. Such compulsion does not necessarily indicate lack 
of extended negotiation between the parties before reaching the final 
terms, less than a full understanding of the import of the terms, or 
inadequate evidence of express assent. Such a choice could be made 
with full knowledge and volition, even if unpleasant. These are not 
adhesion contracts, and formation abuses in such situations can be 
policed with the doctrine of duress. 
Even outside of cases of external pressure and duress, defining 
adhesion contracts is problematic. We can conceive of adhesion 
contracts as contracts where a weaker party has no opportunity to 
negotiate. A party may be unable to negotiate because of a power 
imbalance. Or, the inability to negotiate may be traceable to the fact 
that the terms are standard, imposed in a large number of similar 
transactions by a repeat player. The resistance to negotiating changes 
may be a natural feature of the fact that the forms are already printed. 
More likely, changes are precluded by the cost of training employees 
to answer questions and make decisions in individual cases. Even if a 
business provides a forum for consumers to ask their questions, the 
person on the other end is likely a lower-level employee trained only 
to refuse requests for changes. 
Although non-negotiability is a significant factor in identifying an 
adhesion contract, it is not the only factor for purposes of analysis. A 
non-negotiable contract may still require an overt manifestation of 
knowing assent. In contrast, an adhesion contract is one that purports 
to form, or “adhere” to the weaker party, without any overt 
manifestation of assent, such as signing. In fact, formation may occur 
without any reason to assume the weaker party is aware of the terms 
or even cognizant that a contract exists. 
B. The Origins of Contract by Notice 
With the proliferation of the merchant class and the development 
of high-speed printing presses, various industries began providing 
customers with pre-printed statements of contract terms and 
bypassing a signature requirement or other individualized expression 
of assent.71 In the most complex cases, the terms were printed on 
                                                     
71 See infra Part B.1. For further discussion, see Cheryl B. Preston, Boilerplate from the 
Beginning (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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paper that served other functions, such as railroad tickets,72 bills of 
lading,73 and receipts.74 At some point common law judges slouched 
toward a shady theory of contract by notice, meaning that the 
powerful party had posted the terms that could serve as a defense 
against lawsuits initiated by customers, which we discuss in this 
section. 
1. Posted Notices in Dicta 
Most early courts resolved disputes involving posted terms without 
having to rule on the contract formation issues. As happens with some 
precedents, such as ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,75 which we discuss 
elsewhere,76 and the clickwrap cases,77 the early courts’ precise 
holdings got lost in the memory of the overall result. The first cases 
involved customers who admitted to actual awareness to the contents 
of the notice. Overlooked was the problem of identifying acceptance 
to the new terms. Because the powerful party who posted notice of 
terms prevailed in earlier cases (although for different reasons), some 
later courts believed that a contract by notice could be enforced 
without inquiry into the recipient’s knowledge of the terms, not to 
mention the lack of express acceptance. Businesses did not come 
together with customers to reach an agreement; they stipulated the 
terms of agreement. 
2. Advertising and Usages of Trade 
One of the first cases dealing with posted terms is Gibbon v. 
Paynton from 1769, in which Lord Mansfield appeared to enforce as a 
                                                     
72 Bissell v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 29 Barb. 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 1859) (holding that 
exculpatory terms printed on a railroad ticket did not waive carrier’s liability for criminal 
negligence). 
73 Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (“Lord Tenterden, late 
Abbott, C. J., in his Treatise on Shipping, pt. 3, ch. 4, § 8, p. 296, Story’s ed. of 1822, has 
left on record an instance, in which he thinks that by the usual exception in the bill of 
lading, the master may stand protected against a loss by fire.”).  
74 Cole, 19 Wend. at 277. The court in Cole noted that in Latham v. Rutley, (1823) 107 
Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B.) 290 (Lord Abbott C.J.), the court assumed that “a common carrier by 
land might give a receipt for goods, ‘fire and robbery excepted.’” Id. 
75 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
76 Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 8–9 (arguing that ProCD has been “expanded 
beyond what was required by the case” to justify a myriad of exceptions). 
77 See id. at 29 n.159 (listing cases where the courts justified the acceptance of 
clickwrap contracts, in part, because they had been upheld by other courts, without 
determining if the facts of the present case correspond to the facts of the earlier cases 
enforcing them). 
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contract a statement published as an advertisement by the 
Birmingham Stage Coachman in the local newspaper and distributed 
locally on hand-bills.78 A term in the advertisement was that a 
coachman “would not be answerable for money or jewels or other 
valuable goods, unless he had notice that it was money or jewels or 
valuable goods that was delivered to him to be carried.”79 The 
customer had the duty to give notice, which then resulted in a higher 
price than for carriage of other packages.80 
Lord Mansfield’s opinion suggests that the posted terms were not 
incorporated into the contract based on the advertisement, but that 
they had become trade usages of which the plaintiff had actual 
knowledge.81 Thus, the plaintiff with knowledge who failed to 
disclose that such valuables were in his package, presumably to avoid 
the additional charge, could not escape application of the disclaimer. 
In addition to charging the plaintiff with actual knowledge, Lord 
Mansfield cited the plaintiff for fraud, which would excuse the carrier 
in any event.82 This case does not, as it is sometimes cited,83 stand for 
the proposition that the notice in the advertisement was enforceable as 
a contract. 
Also of significance to Lord Mansfield’s opinion is that the 
common law imposed strict liability for loss of packages by common 
carriers.84 Thus, the court was asked to interpret the notice as a 
special contract sufficient to override the assumption of liability based 
on status. Implied in the opinion is that terms by notice would be 
sufficient, even without a trade usage understanding, in cases 
implicating well-established liability. In any event, the case makes 
clear that by 1769, repeat players were attempting to form contracts 
by notice, although courts were not exactly biting. 
                                                     
78 Gibbon v. Paynton, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B.) 199. 
79 Id. In an earlier case, the court suggests to the carrier that it could have avoided 
liability by making “a caution for himself, which he omitting and taking in the goods 
generally, he shall answer for what happens.” Morse v. Slue, (1684) 86 Eng. Rep. 159 
(K.B.) 159. 
80 Gibbon, 98 Eng. Rep. at 199. 
81 Id. at 200 (Mansfield, J.). 
82 Id. 
83 Gibbon v. Paynton “is remarkable as being among the earliest cases, if not the very 
first case in which the carrier’s notice appears.” Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 266 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). 
84 Gibbon, 98 Eng. Rep. at 200. 
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3. Acceptance and Regret in England 
In 1794 the court in Kirkman v. Shawcross upheld a “notice 
contract” on the basis of actual knowledge rather than trade usage, 
allowing “dyers and bleachers” to create liens for past due amounts 
by virtue of a resolution of the dyers and bleachers association.85 The 
resolution was published in Manchester, England newspapers.86 One 
judge held without analysis: “There is no reason why the resolutions 
made by the different manufacturers should not be considered as 
engrafted upon the agreement between the [parties] . . . by the mutual 
consent of both.”87 But another judge approved simply on the basis 
that liens are on the side of natural justice, missing entirely the 
formation issue.88 Again, however, the plaintiff admitted to reading 
the notice before entering the transaction, which is a requirement 
overlooked in later cases. 
The scope and the merits of the doctrine of contract by notice 
continued to be hotly contested. Some twenty-five years later, in an 
1818 case, a notice posted in the office of a common carrier similarly 
purported to waive liability for any article “above the value of [five 
pounds], unless entered and paid for accordingly.”89 Justice Park 
refused to allow the posted terms to override liability, finding that 
“[t]he doctrine of carriers exempting themselves from liability by 
notice has been carried much too far.”90 Justice Burroughs 
“lament[ed] that the doctrine of notice was ever introduced.”91 Justice 
Burroughs denied that a special contract could thus form and, in any 
event, he found that it was rebutted by proof of “positive 
negligence.”92 
                                                     
85 Kirkman v. Shawcross, (1794) 101 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.B.) 412 (Lord Kenyon C.J.). 
86 Cole, 19 Wend. at 272 (citing Kirkman, 101 Eng. Rep. at 410). 
87 Kirkman, 101 Eng. Rep. at 412. 
88 Id. at 413. 
89 Smith v. Horne, (1818) 129 Eng. Rep. 338 (C.P.) 338. A slightly different version of 
the case is apparently recorded in 2 Moor. 18. This is the source that the judge in Cole 
cites, although we use the official report unless noted otherwise.   
90 Id. In Cole, the court quotes Justice Park’s words in the version of the case as 
recorded in 2 Moor. 18: “The indulgence given to carriers by limiting their responsibility 
by the notices usually affixed in their offices, has occasioned great public inconvenience. 
The courts have lately been inclined to restrain them.” Cole, 19 Wend. at 263 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1838).  
91 Smith, 129 Eng. Rep. at 338-39. 
92 Id. 
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4. Ongoing Dispute in the United States 
United States courts considering the question of contracts by notice 
determined that the common law at the time of the revolution, and 
thus binding on U.S. courts, was against allowing waivers of liability 
by notice. “[I]t is made manifest that in 1776, by the common law, a 
carrier could not limit or modify his extraordinary responsibility by 
notice. . . . It may be safely asserted that the American decisions, with 
scarcely an exception, sustain the old common law doctrine.”93 In 
Fish v. Chapman, the Supreme Court of Georgia admitted that, since 
the American Revolution, England had begun to enforce contracts by 
notice; but, even so, “a carrier cannot by special agreement exempt 
himself from all responsibility, so as to evade altogether the policy of 
the law.”94 
The Fish court’s stated policy for the U.S. position echoes our 
concerns with the power imbalance of businesses and consumers, 
although with nineteenth century literary flare: 
Strong in associated wealth; strong in the mind which is usually 
enlisted in their management; and yet stronger, far stronger, in the 
large immunities and extraordinary privileges with which their 
charters invest them. If these, as carriers, can vary their liability at 
all, at what limits does the power stop? where [sic] are its 
boundaries? Outside of the obligations which their charters impose, 
there would be neither bounds nor limitations; the citizens would be 
at their mercy, bound by their power and subject to their caprices.95 
It is useful to note the reluctance expressed during the years the courts 
struggled with the questions that were later decided in favor of power 
and efficiency. These concerns should still temper our enforcement of 
adhesion contracts. 
The Fish court in 1847 found that the explosion of technology 
mandated the need for restricting the power to contract by notice, 
rather than expanding it. 
This is an age of railroads, steamboat companies, stage companies, 
locomotion and transportation. It is an era of stir—men and goods 
run to and fro—and common carriers are multiplied. The 
convenience of the people and safety of property depend more now, 
I apprehend, upon the rules which regulate the liability of these 
public ministers than at any other period of the world’s history.96 
                                                     
93 Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 359–60 (1847). 
94 Id. at 359. 
95 Id. at 361-62. 
96 Id. at 358. 
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For purposes of understanding the intellectual history of adhesion 
contracts in the United States, the most interesting case is Cole v. 
Goodwin from 1838,97 in which Justice Cowen provided a thorough 
review of efforts by common carriers to waive liability by posted 
terms. In Cole, the court acknowledged the arguments still used for 
enforcing adhesion contracts. For example, the court quotes Justice 
Best in support of the proposition that printed notices may be justified 
for the sake of efficiency: “It would be inconvenient, perhaps 
impossible, to have a formal contract made for the carriage of every 
parcel . . . .”98 This argument of convenience and expense is, of 
course, familiar to us as the basis for defending contracts of adhesion. 
Judge Cowen in Cole, however, did not see efficiency as the end of 
the inquiry. He asked: 
Where is the boundary? [Some say] the carrier himself is to 
prescribe it. If this be so, it is easy to see that the common law is 
overcome, for . . . if this question were entrusted to the party instead 
of the law, the fences against damage and loss would [not] stand for 
a moment.99 
 Judge Cowen described waivers by notice as changing the 
agreement from “give me a due reward, and I will be accountable as a 
common carrier” to “‘give me the same reward,’ (for the carrier fixes 
it; it may be less, but it may also be more,) ‘and yet, I claim to throw 
all risk upon you, or such a degree of it as I please.’”100 Although 
Judge Cowen thought the folly of this approach was obvious, such are 
the common circumstances of today’s adhesion contracts. 
The dispute raged in the United States, as well as England, 
throughout the 1800s. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1848 in New Jersey 
Steam Navigation refused to honor terms 
implied or inferred from a general notice to the public . . . which 
may or may not be assented to. . . . The burden of proof lies on the 
carrier, and nothing short of an express stipulation by parol or in 
writing should be permitted to discharge him from duties which the 
law has annexed to his employment.101 
As the doctrine progressed, some early U.S. courts resisted finding 
terms printed on tickets binding because, as some current courts may 
                                                     
97 Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). 
98 Id. at 266 (quoting Riley v. Horne, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 1044 (C.P.) 1045 (Best 
C.J.). 
99 Cole, 19 Wend. at 273–74. 
100 Id.  
101
 N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 382-83 (1848). 
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agree, a person given a paper that primarily serves another function as 
a receipt or means of retrieval of property does not conceive of it as a 
legal contract and therefore should not be enforced as one.102 In the 
context of railway tickets, for example, “a passenger’s ticket is 
ordinarily a check showing that fare has been paid, and he has no 
reason to suppose that he is entering into a contract.”103 Other courts 
were more apt to hold those terms valid if users were allowed 
sufficient time to familiarize themselves with the terms.104 
5. Academics Weigh In 
The enforceability of contracts by notice was one of the very first 
issues considered significant enough to be reviewed in the newly 
emerged genre of law reviews. In the 1887 volume of the Harvard 
Law Review, an article begins with a discussion of a leading case 
before the House of Lords in England where the majority of the lords 
“were inclined to look on a ticket as a receipt or voucher” and not a 
contract.105 The article then concludes that the dissenting position 
was more persuasive in England and “the decided tendency is to hold 
that a ticket is a contract; and it seems certain that the American 
courts will, before many years pass, come into general agreement 
with the English courts.”106 
However, these “contracts” are of a different species than contracts 
by agreement: “[T]he theory naturally suggests itself that a ticket is 
not a consensual, but a formal, contract. . . . As a matter of fact it is 
evident that a ticket derives all its validity from the custom. The 
necessary elements of a consensual contract are wanting.”107 In 
addition, the author suggested that, to be enforced based on notice, 
terms should be conspicuous with “a peculiar color, or other 
distinguishing mark.”108 
                                                     
102 See, e.g., Rawson v. Pa. R.R., 48 N.Y. 212, 217 (1872) (“It is a mere token or 
voucher adopted for convenience to show that the passenger has paid his fare from one 
place to another. The contract between these parties was made when the plaintiff bought 
her ticket, and the rights and duties of the parties were determined.”). 
103 Kansas City, St. J & C.B.R. Co. v. Rudebaugh, 15 P. Rep. 899, 902 (Kan. 1887). 
104 Compare Wheeler v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 25 N.Y.S. 578, 582-83 (N.Y. 
Gen. Term 1893), with Zimmer v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 137 N.Y. 460, 464 
(1893). 
105 Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Tickets, 1 HARV. L. REV. 17, 19 (1887) (citing McCrae v. 
Marsh, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 211, 211 (1858); Burton v. Scherpf, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 133, 
133 (1861)). 
106 Id. at 22. 
107 Id. at 25–26. 
108 Id. at 30. 
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A decade later, the discussion had evolved to whether failure to 
read was a valid excuse against the imposition of contract terms. In 
1908, the Yale Law Review discussed the continuing split of opinion 
on whether the terms printed on a ticket bound a passenger in the 
absence of actual knowledge of them.109 The author advocated a 
moderate “most reasonable rule” that would excuse passengers from 
application of the terms only if the failure to read, or have someone 
else read the terms to them, was not merely careless.110 
6. Early Twentieth Century Acceptance with Boundaries 
By the turn of the century, however, the trend had shifted to 
enforcing waivers of liability and other restrictions in terms on the 
back of non-negotiated, unsigned tickets, and other documents. In 
1905 a New York court in Collister v. Hayman held that theater 
owners could “make it a part of the contract and a condition of 
admission, by giving due notice and printing the condition in the 
ticket.”111 Although courts gradually accepted adhesion contracts, 
they were initially quite willing to police boundaries. “Common 
carriers must not understand . . . that they can impose any terms 
which they please upon persons who send goods.”112 Courts refused 
to enforce contracts by notice if their scope was too wide or their 
terms too outrageous. In Oppenheim v. Russell, one judge declared 
that a particular notice was “so manifestly unreasonable and 
monstrous, that . . . no legal agreement can be implied from such a 
notice.”113 Early on a distinction was made between waivers of mere 
negligence and waivers of misconduct.114 
                                                     
109 Recent Cases, Carriers—Limitation of Liability—Notice to Passenger.—French v. 
Merchants’ & Miners’ Transp. Co., 85 N.E. 424 (Mass.), 18 YALE L.J. 61 (1908). 
Compare Potter v. Majestic, 56 F. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) (finding that a passenger was not 
bound to a notice printed on the back of a ticket and not referred to in the body of the 
ticket when the passenger had not read it), with Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Riney, 92 S.W. 
54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906) (finding a passenger bound to the legal effect of the conditions 
on the ticket whether read or not). See also Recent Case, Carriers — Tickets — Notice of 
Limitation upon Time for Use, 16 HARV. L. REV. 139 (1902) (comparing cases on various 
sides of this issue). 
110 Carriers—Limitation of Liability—Notice to Passenger, supra note 109.  
111 Collister v. Hayman, 76 N.E. 20, 21 (N.Y. 1905). 
112 Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251, 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (quoting Nicholson v. 
Willan, (1804) 2 Smith 107 (K.B.) 113 (Lawrence J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
113 Id. at 273 (quoting Oppenheim v. Russell, (1802) 127 Eng. Rep. 24 (C.P.) 30) 
(Chambre J.).  
114 Lyon v. Mells, (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 1134 (K.B.) 1135; see also N.J. Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 368–69 (1848). 
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In the twentieth century, while this early, shaky doctrine of 
contract by notice led to general acceptance of contracts of adhesion, 
courts continued to articulate boundaries and conditions. These 
implied or formal contracts, rather than contracts by agreement, 
became subject to protective doctrines that were established as 
conditions to enforcement. These augmented the specific limitations 
articulated in early cases accepting contracts by notice, discussed in 
the prior subsection. 
The common law included a version of unconscionability doctrine 
where courts found creative ways to refuse to enforce terms that felt 
overreaching, usually by relying on other contract doctrines or 
interpreting the terms against the drafter.115 Regulation of unfair 
practices and terms in contracting was naturally within the purview of 
courts of equity.116 Eventually, courts of law took over this 
function.117 The U.S. Supreme Court in 1889 held a bargain to be 
unconscionable in an action at law if it was “such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no 
honest and fair man would accept on the other.”118 
Even if not characterized as “unconscionability” analysis, during 
the rise of adhesion contracting, judges still believed they had an 
honorable, if not holy, duty to come up with some explanation—no 
matter how stretched—to find a contract or a particular term 
unenforceable in disturbing circumstances.119 As early as 1919, 
commentators complained that “[w]hile the consideration of public 
policy does not seem to have been strong enough in any case to 
induce the court to make a direct frontal attack, courts have in several 
cases executed successful flanking movements . . . thus straining the 
language out of its clear meaning.”120 While courts claimed to 
                                                     
115 See Robyn L. Meadows, Unconscionability as a Contract Policing Device for the 
Elder Client: How Useful Is It?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 741, 741–42 (2005) (citing Carol B. 
Swanson, Unconscionability Quandary: UCC Article 2 and the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, 31 N.M.L. REV. 359, 361 (2001)). 
116 Meadows, supra note 115 (citing Evelyn L. Brown, The Uncertainty of U.C.C. 
Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105 COM. L.J. 287, 289–90 
n.3 (2000)). 
117 Meadows, supra note 115 (citing Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: 
A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 468 n.4 (1999)). 
118 Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. 
Janssen, (1750) 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.) 100). 
119 Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 1090 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price 
Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 704 (1931) [hereinafter 
Llewellyn, What Price]). 
120 Patterson, supra note 4, at 222. 
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enforce adhesion contracts against less powerful parties, “the majority 
still allow[ed] recovery by the back door, so to speak.”121 Further: 
[C]ourts have made great efforts to protect the weaker contracting 
party and still keep “the elementary rules” of the law of contracts 
intact. As a result, our common law of standardized contracts is 
highly contradictory and confusing, and the potentialities inherent 
in the common law system for coping with contracts of adhesion 
have not been fully developed.122 
Or with more flair: 
The freedom of contract dogma is the real hero or villain in the 
drama . . . but it prefers to remain in the safety of the background if 
possible, leaving the actual fighting to consideration and to the host 
of other satellites—all of which is very often confusion to the 
audience which vaguely senses the unreality of the atmosphere.123 
These practices continued through the adoption of the UCC.124 In 
1953, Professor Ehrenzweig acknowledged, “[a] court can ‘construe’ 
language into patently not meaning what the language is patently 
trying to say. It can find inconsistencies between clauses and throw 
out the troublesome one[,] . . . reject a clause as counter to the whole 
purpose” or employ “other techniques to reach a desired result.”125 
As Karl Llwellyn and his colleagues of the Realist movement in 
jurisprudence often attested, most courts simply reached what they 
believed was the right result. Claiming to apply settled natural law 
doctrine, but without any consistent theory or articulation of 
standards,126 resulted in chaos.127 Perhaps the problem was, with the 
hordes of new lawyers128 (and printers), many people could read 
                                                     
121 Kessler, supra note 18, at 635. 
122 Id. at 633. 
123 Id. at 639. 
124 See infra Part IV. 
125 Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 1090 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
126 “Realists criticized the classical view that legal reasoning consisted solely of the 
syllogistic application of rules and precedents. They challenged the determinacy of legal 
rules and emphasized the range of choices presented to a judge in a given case.” ROBERT 
L. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 156–57 (2d ed. 2002) 
(citing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2–3 (1955)). 
127 Curtis Nyquist, Single Case Research and the History of American Legal Thought, 
45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 598 (2011) (“The essence of the [Realist’s] attack on the 
Classical system was that a formal rules system did not, and could not, work.”). 
128
 B. Peter Pashigian, The Number and Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 
3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 51, 53 (1978) (noting there was a “30 percent increase in the 
number of lawyers (and judges) between 1920 and 1930”); THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., 
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court opinions and discuss how courts who claimed to apply 
established rules really did not; the whole mess was alarmingly 
inconsistent.129 As decades passed, courts became less and less 
comfortable with applying such discretion to police contracts without 
a concrete doctrine on which to rely. 
IV 
LLEWELLYN AND MODERN ADHESION WITH FENCES 
Even before the UCC, Karl Llewellyn, one of the most outspoken 
and influential drafters of the UCC, questioned the extent to which 
contracts of adhesion should be enforced.130 While acknowledging 
that these standard, pre-printed, non-negotiable forms were a staple of 
business and that their use increased efficiency in many ways, 
Llewellyn was also acutely aware of the risks of giving unlimited 
license to one party to impose one-sided terms.131 Llewellyn 
criticized the assumption that the non-drafting party had actually 
agreed to all of the terms in boilerplate clauses embedded within pre-
printed agreements.132 “What has been assented to,” Llewellyn noted: 
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, 
and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not 
a specific assent) to any  not unreasonable or indecent terms 
the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the 
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.133 
Llewellyn and others became supporters of the use of adhesive 
forms,134 notwithstanding their full awareness about the legal skill 
levels and practice habits of small businesses.135 In the famous words 
                                                                                                                 
RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-1990 483 (1991) (reporting that 
the “production of new lawyers . . . quadrupled between 1960 and 1980.”). 
129 HAYMAN, LEVIT & DELGADO, supra note 126, at 156–57 (arguing that, boiled down 
to crude simplicity, the Realists challenged Formalists’ conception of the law’s certainty). 
130 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 362 (1960) [hereinafter 
Llewellyn, Tradition]); Llewellyn, Book Review, supra note 11, at 703; Llewellyn, What 
Price, supra note 119, at 731–32. 
131 Id. 
132 LLEWELLYN, Tradition, supra note 130, at 370. 
133 Id. 
134 Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 119, at 704–05. 
135 The UCC was based on a desire to change the law merchant to be compatible with 
the actual practice of small businesses that could not afford legal counsel for their 
transactions, but routinely used pre-printed forms with legal terms. See LLEWELLYN, 
Tradition, supra note 130, at 362. 
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of Bob Dylan, “times, they [were] a-changin”136 and with those times 
came some new problems that forced UCC drafters to make 
concessions to facilitate the growth of small businesses. Llewellyn 
nonetheless imagined a state of contract law that was comfortable 
with letting non-negotiated terms slide, so long as there were safety 
nets to prevent this allowance from swallowing the protections built 
into traditional contract law.137 And in doing so he let the camel stick 
his head into the tent.138 
A. UCC and Parties Who Do Not See 
The 1952 UCC was the result of ten years of drafting as a joint 
project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and the American Law Institute. The drafters of the UCC 
were concerned about unwary consumers,139 but they were also in 
tune with the realities of small businesses: the lack of regular access 
to lawyers and the problems of employees untrained in contract 
rules.140 Even if lawyers had become much cheaper than they once 
were, the goals of the UCC could not be met if businesses could not 
pull some paperwork off a stack of forms affixed at one side with 
padded adhesive and stick one in every box. The cost of re-drafting 
would be prohibitive for anyone who could barely afford to have a 
lawyer draft the contract once. Not to mention, the cost of using 
employee time to negotiate details would have been both expensive 
and scary because of the fear of what some employee might agree to 
without close supervision. 
The drafters of the UCC recognized that the forms provided by the 
businesses were very likely non-negotiable141—that was true even if 
                                                     
136 BOB DYLAN, THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964) 
(“Come senators, congressmen/Please heed the call/Don’t stand in the doorway/Don’t 
block up the hall/For he that gets hurt/Will be he who has stalled/There’s a battle 
outside/And it’s ragin’/It’ll soon shake your windows/And rattle your walls/For the times 
they are achangin”). We recognize that the lyrics in this song were likely written to 
encourage something more noble than consumer contract protection. But as lawyers who 
have chosen to be interested in contract law, we will use our imaginations and make up an 
era of passionate contract-law-related revolutions, if we have to. 
137 Llewellyn, Tradition, supra note 130, at 369–70. 
138 See HORACE E. SCUDDER, THE CHILDREN’S BOOK 18 (1907). 
139 See Llewellyn, Tradition, supra note 130, at 370 (discussing Llewellyn’s concerns 
that standard forms could become too dangerous for consumers if not reined in). 
140 See id. 
141 For a discussion on Llewellyn’s ideas about standard forms and the enforceability of 
terms Llewellyn understood to be standard or non-negotiable, yet conscionable, see 
generally Hillman, supra note 16. 
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such consumer was a contract lawyer, as we are both personally 
aware. Businesses presented customers with take-it-or-leave-it, 
boilerplate-filled, one-sided standard form contracts, making the 
ability to speak one’s wishes to a neutral scrivener in the contracting 
process ancient history. In response to these concerns, UCC drafters 
attempted to curb the negative side effects of adhesion contracting by 
articulating a series of buffering protections. 
1. UCC 2-207, Battle of the Forms 
Preprinted form contracts did not just affect transactions between 
businesses and non-business consumers—it had some complicated 
effects on business-to-business transactions as well. The UCC drafters 
were aware that, in the craze to have a form that was twisted in one’s 
own favor and sporting one’s zany logo, businesses were exchanging 
forms that were unquestionably counter-offers under contract 
doctrine.142 Thus, either a contract never did form, it formed in some 
other way without any terms at all, or it formed based on the terms of 
whichever party was lucky enough to have sent the last form in the 
volleys—thanks to the ancient and venerable contract doctrine now 
called the “last shot rule.”143 
The UCC drafters decided to flout tradition and declare that, in 
some circumstances,144 a contract based on contradicting forms 
formed anyway.145 Despite their intent to bring some peace to the 
“Battle of the Forms,” the drafters declared that the scope of the terms 
would be decided under some process that has bewildered law 
scholars, not to mention students and practitioners, for half a 
century.146 That process is found in the now-infamous UCC section 
2-207.147 Section 2-207 was drafted in recognition that not even 
                                                     
142 UCC § 2-207, cmt. 1 (2004).   
143 See Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 
1986) (discussing how UCC § 2-207 did “away with the last shot rule”). 
144 Knowing which circumstances is confusing— just ask Judge Easterbrook who once 
thought two written forms were required. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant.”). 
145 See UCC § 2-207(1). 
146 Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
2678, 2679 (2000) (“There is probably no other provision within the U.C.C. Article 2 that 
provides more confusion to law students and more challenge to the instructor than does 
section 2-207.”). 
147 For a discussion on the various interpretations and implications of UCC section 2-
207 and the multiple approaches for using it, see generally, John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J. L. & COM. 1 (2000). 
Unfortunately, § 2-207 will continue to confound even the most patient into the 
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business people read or otherwise register the legal implications of the 
terms provided by the other party.148 
The UCC drafters embedded a safety net directly into sections 2-
207(2) and (3) by requiring affirmative assent to terms the other party 
would not likely have noticed or agreed to and by inserting fair, 
balanced terms in their place.149 Material terms that are asserted in 
the non-dickered part of a company’s forms do not become added to 
the contract without some clear evidence of assent to such terms.150 If 
the contract forms under section 2-207(1) notwithstanding the failure 
of both parties’ terms aligning, then the different and additional terms 
are governed by subsection (2). If the parties are both merchants, the 
second sentence of subsection (2) kicks in.151 This subsection 
provides that if the additional terms are material, they will be thrown 
out. The official comments describe “material” terms as those that 
will “result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express 
awareness by the other party”152 and non-material terms as those 
“which involve no element of unreasonable surprise” such as terms 
that only “slightly” alter obligations and do so in “reasonable” 
ways.153 Thus, subsection (2) is one means of protecting parties from 
terms of which they are not aware. If the contract forms merely by 
conduct, under subsection (3) the terms of the contract are only those 
contained in both forms, along with any supplemental terms implied 
by the UCC—those considered fair, balanced, and reflective of 
ordinary business expectations.154 
                                                                                                                 
foreseeable future as the helpful proposed revisions were thrown out with the bathwater 
when the revised UCC Article 2 was rejected, embarrassingly, in 2011. Current Projects, 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects 
.proj_ip&projectid=4 (last visited July 25, 2012) (“The 2003 amendments to UCC Articles 
2 and 2A were withdrawn in 2011.”).  
148 LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
806 (3d ed. 2004). 
149 Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The 
majority view is that the discrepant terms fall out and are replaced by a suitable UCC gap-
filler.”); Victor P. Goldberg, The “Battle of the Forms”: Fairness, Efficiency, and the 
Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155, 160 (1997) (“A majority of jurisdictions have adopted 
the ‘knockout’ rule.”); see also Diamond Fruit, 794 F.2d at 1445 (requiring a specific and 
unequivocal expression of assent on the part of the offeror when the offeree conditions its 
acceptance on assent to additional or different terms). 
150 UCC § 2-207(1). 
151 UCC § 2-207(2). 
152 UCC § 2-207, cmt. 4. 
153 UCC § 2-207, cmt. 5. 
154 UCC § 2-207(3). 
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2. UCC § 2-302, Unconscionability 
The second safety net envisioned by Llewellyn and others was the 
doctrine of unconscionability. As mentioned in Part III.B, courts had 
been using the term “unconscionability” long before the UCC drafters 
made a provision governing the doctrine’s use.155 As early as 1868 
courts mentioned and assessed clauses in contracts according to 
principles of fairness and overreaching.156 
“Unconscionability, as provided for in the Code, arose from the 
common law.”157 Courts were initially unable to invalidate contracts 
simply because the terms seemed unfair.158 As a result, these very 
annoyed courts began to get creative, looking for any reason to refuse 
to enforce the contract by finding problems with the construction or 
by merely citing “public policy” as a barrier to enforcement.159 
Charles Knapp has argued that the doctrine initially came about 
because merchants tried to “impose on their customers contracts that 
were grossly unbalanced and inequitable—either because the effects 
of those contracts were not initially apparent or because the 
merchants’ raw economic power enabled them to do so.”160 But pre-
UCC courts were relying on the doctrine before it had been labeled 
and defined and “[t]hese types of machinations created inconsistent 
and unpredictable results.”161 
The doctrine received a considerable boost when it became 
codified in the UCC.162 Unconscionability, after it was enshrined in 
the UCC, began to be called upon as the doctrine of choice to police 
market behavior that went too far in wielding commercial will against 
those without bargaining power.163 The hope was that having an 
                                                     
155 UCC § 2-302. 
156 Sussex R.R. Co. v. Morris & Essex R.R., 19 N.J. Eq. 13, 27 (N.J. Ch. 1868) 
(discussing but refusing to apply unconscionability in a commercial contract and finding 
that, while the clause in question “at first view, seemed very unequal and unconscionable,” 
the parties “agreed to these terms because they could not get better,” and this was not 
sufficient to prove unconscionability). 
157 Meadows, supra note 115, at 742. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: 
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 613 (2009). 
161 Meadows, supra note 115, at 742. 
162 See UCC § 2-302. 
163 Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a 
Remedy for Contractual Overreaching, 44 GA. L. REV. 317, 348 (2010) (explaining that 
unconscionability was a primary tool courts used to protect consumers from overreaching 
acts throughout the 1960s and 1970s). 
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articulated doctrine that could help police overreaching behaviors 
would lead to more predictable results. Now, judges uncomfortable 
with contracts they deemed unfair had an articulated doctrine to 
apply.164 
The unconscionability doctrine became fixed early in the consumer 
protection movement in American jurisprudence that began in the 
1960s and hit its apex in the 1970s.165 Although that doctrine was in 
circulation before the UCC or courts reached the same result with 
other kinds of contortions,166 the drafters of the UCC went further in 
setting forth an express statement of this protection. UCC section 2-
302(1) provides that a court that finds a term to be unconscionable 
may invalidate the whole contract, throw out the unconscionable 
term, or limit the unconscionable term’s application. Llewellyn once 
went on record stating that UCC section 2-302 was “perhaps the most 
valuable section in the entire Code.”167 
Llewellyn expressly stated that a contract drafter could not bind 
another party to terms that seem “unreasonable” or “indecent” unless 
these terms were actually “dickered” by both parties.168 While a 
modern lawyer may argue that the clauses in online contracts are not 
unreasonable or indecent, there is little question that they would have 
been so characterized in Llewellyn’s days.169 
In 1969, John Spanogle noted Llewellyn’s emphasis on the 
unconscionability doctrine and its intent to “inhibit the businessman 
or attorney from automatically asserting all conceivable rights in all 
transactions.”170 Llewellyn may possibly have intended for 
                                                     
164
 See Meadows, supra note 115, at 741. 
165
 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale 
Approach to Unconscionability, LOY. U. CHI. L.J. at 36 (forthcoming) (citing Brown, 
supra note 123, at 287) (discussing the progression of unconscionability over the decades, 
noting that some commentators in the 1970s began to “declare its demise”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2053536; Jane K. Winn & Mark 
Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract Terms Law on U.S. Business-To-Consumer 
Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 211 (2006) (noting decrease in U.S. consumer 
protection legal activity since the 1960s and 1970s).   
166 Llewellyn, What Price, supra note 119, at 734. Courts were apparently addressing 
unconscionability at least as early as 1868. Sussex R.R v. Morris & Essex R.R., 19 N.J. 
Eq. 13 (N.J. Ch. 1868) (discussing unconscionability in the context of a railroad contract). 
167 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 2004) 
(quoting 1 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 121 (1954)). 
168 Id. § 4.26. 
169 See UCC § 2-207 (official comments). 
170 John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
931, 941 (1969). 
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unconscionability to function in a much broader realm than it had by 
the time Spanogle wrote his article in 1969. But at the very least, 
UCC drafters did intend for unconscionability to protect parties in 
form contracts; the first draft of UCC section 2-302 was specifically 
limited to standard form contracts.171 
It seems that, at least for a time, Llewellyn’s hope had come to 
fruition—that the “most valuable section” would protect consumers as 
the pre-printed forms came to be more and more common. Professor 
Knapp argued that the: 
doctrine of unconscionability seems actually to have done in the 
1960s and 1970s precisely what its proponents might have hoped: it 
helped produce, at least for a while, a legal climate in which . . . 
[a]common voice sought to dispense a better brand of justice to 
consumers—not just to consumers of goods and services, but to 
consumers of the legal system itself.172 
Unfortunately, this momentum for a “better brand of justice” was 
far too short-lived. After the newly-codified unconscionability 
doctrine was put to use in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co.,173 it was largely halted by scholars, the law and economics 
movement, and a fear of judicial activism. 
B. Restatement (Second) Good Faith, Unconscionability, and 
Reasonable Expectations 
In 1979 Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205 implied in 
every contract “a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement.”174 It also included a provision for 
voiding contracts based on a finding of unconscionability. The 
purpose of this section was to clearly articulate the fences that 
controlled contracting abuses, particularly those common with 
adhesion contracts. Comment (a) to section 208 recites the purpose 
and elements of unconscionability doctrine: “The determination that a 
contract or term is or is not unconscionable is made in the light of its 
setting, purpose and effect. . . . [T]he policy also overlaps with rules 
which render particular bargains or terms unenforceable on grounds 
                                                     
171 See id. at 942 (citation omitted). Spanogle also noted that all unconscionability cases 
up to 1969 involved standard form contracts. Id. at 942 n.47. 
172 Knapp, supra note 160, at 614. 
173 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
174 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). 
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of public policy.”175 The drafters of the Restatement closely followed 
the lead of the UCC in crafting and justifying these sections. 
Another concept that provided a means to control abuse of standard 
form contracts appeared in section 211(3). It provides that “[w]here 
the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such 
assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a 
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”176 Section 211 
was enacted in response to the decay of unconscionability doctrine, 
which left consumers with little protection against overreaching 
terms.177 Some commentators have viewed the enactment of section 
211 as a sort of last-ditch effort to try to save the dwindling consumer 
protection movement.178 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its potential as a restraint on 
adhesion contract abuses, the “reasonable expectations” protection 
contained in section 211(3) fared even worse in practice than the 
doctrine of unconscionability. Most of the cases that have cited this 
comment and its accompanying subsection involved insurance 
companies179 and attest to its limited application in practice. The 
drafters clearly intended more. The illustrations following this 
comment show that section 211(3) was not intended to be limited to 
insurance contracts.180 
But section 211(3) was not ignored everywhere. Tennessee has 
developed a doctrine known as the “circle of assent” that embodies 
the “reasonable expectations” principle of 211(3).181 The “circle of 
assent” means that “the party who signs a printed form furnished by 
the other party will be bound by the provisions in the form over which 
the parties actually bargained and such other provisions that are not 
                                                     
175 Id. § 208, cmt. a. 
176 Id. § 211(3). 
177 Id. 
178 See Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-For Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 506 (2008) (citing Murray, supra note 147 (discussing 
Second Restatement § 211 in depth), and Wayne R. Barnes, Toward A Fairer Model of 
Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 
211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 265 (2007)).  
179 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Grabowski, 150 P.3d 275, 279 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2007); Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1050 (D.C. 1996). 
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) & illustrations 7, 8 (1981). 
181 Robert M. Lloyd, The “Circle of Assent” Doctrine: An Important Innovation in 
Contract Law, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 239 (2006). 
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unreasonable in view of the circumstances.”182 Although the 
expectations concept is not unique in Tennessee, it is rarely used by 
other courts in non-insurance contexts.183 
V 
DETERIORATION OF THE DISINCENTIVES FOR ABUSE 
During the 1970s and 1980s, careful legal scholars continued to 
address the nuances and the balances required to make the leap from 
knowing assent to a world of form contracts.184 The need for 
boundaries was still a fundamental assumption,185 but strong 
economists were opening fire. The first doctrine to come under 
scrutiny was unconscionability. As a result, judges became hesitant to 
apply the doctrine for fear of being labeled “activists.” Economists 
had a similarly invasive effect on law schools and courts in general, 
the capstone of which is the U.S. Supreme Court case Carnival 
Cruise v. Shute186 and its later use by courts as the symbol of 
efficiency over contract doctrine.187 
A. First Assaults on Unconscionability 
In 1967, Arthur Leff wrote his seminal article The Emperor’s New 
Clause, which directly challenged the Walker-Thomas decision and 
argued for the two-prong unconscionability requirement—procedural 
                                                     
182 Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile-Cadillac-Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637-38 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). 
183 Lloyd, supra note 181, at 243. 
184 See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (discussing these competing policies, courts’ trouble 
dealing with contracts in the 1980s, and the problems associated with accepting form 
contracts as valid); Eric Mills Holmes & Dagmar Thürmann, A New and Old Theory for 
Adjudicating Standardized Contracts, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323 (1987); John E. 
Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized Agreements Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975); John P. Dawson, 
Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976) (same 
discussion but in the context of German law). 
185 Slawson, supra note 16, at 529. 
186 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
187 A shining example of this appears in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 
(1996), in which Judge Easterbrook cites Carnival Cruise for its efficient contract 
formation principles that allow drafters to avoid a much more “cumbersome way of doing 
things” which would “not only . . . lengthen queues and raise prices but also would scotch 
the sale of tickets by phone or electronic data service.” Id. 
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and substantive unconscionability.188 While this article did not 
completely undermine unconscionability doctrine, it proved to be a 
significant blow as discretionary findings of unconscionability could 
no longer stand unchallenged.189 In fact, as of June 2012, 408 law 
review articles and fifty judicial decisions have cited The Emperor’s 
New Clause.190 
Others joined in, arguing that market interaction could provide the 
incentives necessary to achieve efficient outcomes, without judicial 
policing.191 They believed that, as consumers bargained, they either 
would agree on terms that were more favorable or would be 
compensated for agreeing to less favorable terms. Either of these 
options would lead to efficient outcomes without the need to alter 
contracts post hoc. Further, economists complained that businesses 
could not easily predict what terms would be found 
unconscionable.192 Theoretically, that would leave businesses to 
guess as to their potential litigation costs and result in inefficiencies. 
Simply following the economists’ line of thinking arguably made 
things easier for judges: using an economist approach allowed judges 
to simply enforce the contract without losing any sleep over its lack of 
fairness.193 
B.  Politics and the Fear of Activism 
Almost simultaneously in the 1960s, a fear of judicial activism 
began to grow. This fear was evidenced as early as 1968.194 Richard 
Nixon’s campaign platform included an anti-judicial-activist prong, 
which was allegedly a response to the perceived activism of the 
Warren court.195 This fear of judicial activism was rooted in the 
alleged subjectivity of unconscionability—the idea that a judge will 
                                                     
188 Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487, 505 n.71 (1967) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
189 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 818 (2004). 
190 Findings from WestLaw as of June 18, 2012. 
191 Stempel, supra note 189, at 822–23. 
192 Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 73, 75, 94 (2007). 
193 Stempel, supra note 189, at 823. 
194 Id. at 826. 
195 Id. 
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simply rule for whichever party he or she personally likes.196 Some 
critics even suggest that judges decide cases based on what makes 
their “pulses race or their cheeks redden, so as to justify the 
destruction of a particular provision.”197 These critics feared 
opportunity for this type of judicial activism, and their fear was rooted 
in the belief that unconscionability does not have objective 
requirements or guidelines.198 
The shift away from protecting consumers happened at various 
levels. In the 1960s commentators touted the “great consumer 
protection” movement in legislation that arose because of the “failure 
of the legal system.”199 Soon thereafter, much of the consumer 
legislation was repealed or relaxed in application, a change credited to 
Republican administrations.200 “After a series of highly publicized 
courtroom and legislative successes in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
consumer movement suffered several setbacks in the 1980s [caused] 
by the Reagan and Bush administrations, whose chief ‘consumer 
protection’ goal was to release businesses from what they perceived 
as unnecessary, costly, and anti-competitive regulations.”201 Professor 
Jane Winn and Brian Bix observed in 2006: “[I]n recent decades, the 
skepticism regarding the efficacy of government regulation has been 
growing at the same time that enthusiasm for market-driven 
institutional arrangements has increased. . . . Courts and regulators in 
the U.S. are generally deferential to private initiative and innovations 
in marketing.”202 The judicial return to formalism and its exclusive 
focus on certainty and predictability has encouraged a “flurry of 
neoformalism in contracts scholarship.”203 The focus in contract law, 
                                                     
196 Schmitz, supra note 192, at 96. 
197 Id. (quoting Leff, supra note 188, at 516). 
198 Schmitz, supra note 192, at 96. 
199 Robert H. Quinn, Consumer Protection Comes of Age in Massachusetts, 4 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 71, 72 (1969). Foundational texts for the consumer movement include 
DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967); JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN 
WAY OF DEATH (1963); RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
200 Stephen Meili, Forum, Consumer Law Project at Wisconsin Law School, 1992 WIS. 
L. REV. 1725, 1725 (1992). 
201 Id. 
202 Jane K. Winn & Brian H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in 
the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 183–84 (2006). They also note that “[o]utside 
the U.S., however, the notion that unmediated market forces should play a greater role in 
the relationship between merchants and consumers has not been embraced so eagerly.” Id. 
at 183. 
203 William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. 
REV. 971, 1004 (2001). 
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as well as numerous other legal fields, has shifted since the early days 
of adhesion contracts. Consumer interests are now freely subsumed 
by renewed support for powerful, repeat players. 
C.  Economists Co-Opt Courts 
The Posner-Easterbrook invasion continued the push for economic 
theorizing in contract law.204 At that time courts began overstating the 
one horn of the adhesion dilemma—the value of form contracts and 
merits of enforcing them to the letter—and increasingly lost sight of 
the other horn—maintaining the consistency of contract formation 
principles.205 These courts relied on the analysis of early thinkers to 
justify adhesion contracts, notwithstanding their violence to core 
private law assumptions of free and knowing choice, but largely 
omitted consideration of the other half of the analysis.206 
The law and economics movement stayed strong through the years, 
becoming the dominant intellectual and jurisprudential sub-discipline 
of law from the late 1970s.207 The influence of the law and economics 
movement is further illustrated by the influence of one of its leading 
scholars, Judge Richard Posner. Posner has written hundreds of 
opinions involving contract law, the third most of any judge behind 
only Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo and Justice Roger J. Traynor.208 
                                                     
204 For detailed discussions of the specifics of the economic theories, see Eric A. 
Posner, Essay, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003); Richard Craswell, In That Case, What is the 
Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903 (2003); 
and Ian Ayers, Responses, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881 
(2003). 
205 For a discussion on early thoughts about adhesion contracts and their acceptance, 
see Warkentine, supra note 178, at 489. 
206 See, e.g., Sullivan v. Savin Bus. Machs. Corp., 560 F. Supp. 938, 940 (N.D. Ind. 
1983) (explaining that “[t]here are often valid reasons militating in favor of so-called 
‘adhesion contracts,’ not the least of which is the desire for a uniform facilitation of the 
conduct of trade”); Huff v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 702 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1985) (calling adhesion contracts “necessary” and noting that “just because a 
contract is described as a contract of adhesion does not mean that it is unenforceable”); 
Rory v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 41 (Mich. 2005) (choosing to recognize adhesion 
contracts as enforceable just like any other contract “because [that view] is most consonant 
with traditional contract principles [that the] state has historically honored”). 
207 Stempel, supra note 189, at 824. 
208 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1379, 1383 (1995). The measure was “based on a tabulation of the number 
of opinions by all judges reproduced as main cases in current contracts casebooks. The 
survey includes majority as well as dissenting and concurring opinions, but it excludes 
cases that are only cited or summarized rather than being reprinted substantially in full.” 
Id. 
PRESTON (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2012  2:17 PM 
2012] Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky Contracts and Feudalism 165 
Since unconscionability doctrine and the economists’ free market 
principles seemed unable to coexist, the movement pushed 
unconscionability further from the minds of judges.209 
D. The Collapse of Unconscionability 
Caught between the stampeding law and economics movement and 
the growing trend of anti-activist cynicism, unconscionability was 
thrown from the saddle. In the early 1980s there were only thirty-
three cases involving UCC section 2-203, and of those, only one 
clearly cited unconscionability.210 From January 2004 to January 
2005, only thirty-three unconscionability claims were allowed to 
proceed past the summary judgment stage.211 Only seven of those 
cases ended with the court invalidating the contract.212 
This dearth of successful unconscionability cases has continued. In 
addition, when courts have resorted to unconscionability in the last 
decade, it has been in conjunction with the imposition of arbitration 
clauses.213 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court has all but entirely 
squelched unconscionability as a defense to defeat mandatory 
arbitration. Unconscionability has been bucked, trampled, kicked, and 
bitten into relative obscurity. 
While a diluted form of unconscionability is still viable in some 
states, its existence is no longer very helpful in the context of online 
contracts. The kinds of cases in which even a weak unconscionability 
finding is likely are those involving extremely sympathetic parties 
who are unusually disadvantaged by class, age, education, language 
skills, intellectual capacity, inner city location, cultural unfamiliarity, 
and inexperience.214 In other words, the sort of person who is 
shopping online and engaging in social networking on his or her 
                                                     
209 Stempel, supra note 189, at 824–25. 
210 Schmitz, supra note 192, at 94. Professor Eric Posner also commented on this shift, 
explaining that unconscionability analysis in published opinions was rare by 1995. Eric A. 
Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 
306–07 (1995).  
211 Schmitz, supra note 192, at 93–94. 
212 Id. 
213 See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010) (requiring 
claims that a contract with an arbitration clause failed to form because of 
unconscionability be heard by an arbitrator); and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (finding enforceable an arbitration clause in a mobile phone 
subscriber contract even though it would deprive consumers the option of class action). 
214 Preston, supra note 26, at 257. 
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smart phone is not likely to qualify. Online consumers are generally 
savvy enough to use, and privileged enough to have access to, a 
computer. 
Moreover, “the substantive elements for unconscionability are too 
numerous and complex to be workable in large numbers of contract 
cases.”
215
 Apprehensive of delving into an exercise in discretion that 
may be labeled “activist,” courts will engage in unconscionability 
analysis only in the most obvious, traditional cases,216 and those will 
not include the typical online shopper. 
The treatment of online contracts challenged as unconscionable is 
well-illustrated by a recent Fifth Circuit case that upheld, with very 
little discussion, a ruling that online terms were not unconscionable, 
even though they “were on a subpage of [the drafter’s] website and in 
the equivalent of four-point font.”217 The court was satisfied that they 
were “sufficiently legible and accessible.”218 The court did, however, 
note the concern with allowing these contracting practices outright 
and explained, “contracts formed in whole or in part over the internet 
present relatively new considerations for the courts, and will continue 
to challenge the courts as the internet plays an increasingly important 
role in commerce.”219 The court alleged that “[w]hile new commerce 
on the internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not 
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”220  Ironically, the 
court then suggested that the “principles of contract” that continue to 
apply online do not include unconscionability. 
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit’s approach to online contracts is 
not unique. Courts across the country seem to be following this trend 
of accepting online, non-negotiable contracts that U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Sotomayor would have considered unenforceable just ten 
years ago when she wrote the majority opinion for the Second Circuit 
in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.221 Other recent 
                                                     
215 Slawson, supra note 16, at 564. 
216 Perhaps the most oft-cited unconscionability scenario is represented by Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which the sympathetic 
parties, who were faced with highly overreaching boilerplate terms, were uneducated and 
vulnerable to abuse.  
217 One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 264, 270 (5th 
Cir. 2011). 
218 Id. at 264. 
219 Id. at 268. 
220 Id. (quoting Register.com, Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
221 Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a 
browsewrap contract buried in a webpage with little notice to the customer was 
unenforceable). 
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examples of courts rejecting unconscionability claims in online 
contracts include Pentacostal Temple Church v. Streaming Faith, 
LLC,222 in which a court threw out an unconscionability argument, 
holding that a customer who has notice of contract terms does not 
have a basis for claiming procedural unconscionability. In Evans v. 
Linden Research, Inc.,223 the court found that a forum selection 
clause was not unconscionable in an online contract because the 
consumer had to click “I agree” before proceeding, and therefore had 
notice of the terms.224 Thus, the inferred notice from a thoughtless 
click alone had become enough to swallow unconscionability 
analysis. The court seems to have forgotten that unconscionability 
doctrine is not about whether there was evidence of acceptance. After 
all, in Walker-Thomas, Ms. Williams had signed a lengthy agreement. 
E. Attenuated Assent and the Shutes 
As adhesion contracts became deeply entrenched in market 
practice and law, other contract principles not ordinarily thought of as 
policing doctrines retained some part of the foundational contract 
principles of choice and autonomy. Most importantly, the concept of 
knowing assent assured that, at the minimum, weaker contracting 
parties had notice that terms existed and required some action in 
circumstances laden with cautionary signals.225 
However, in the last two decades, courts have accepted 
“implications” rather than “manifestations” of knowing assent.226 The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Carnival Cruise v. Shute227 was a 
significant marker of the erosion of the knowing assent requirement. 
Of Carnival Cruise, Judge Easterbrook bragged: “These days even 
left-wing judges enforce forum-selection clauses in tiny type on the 
back of steamship tickets.”228 
                                                     
222 Pentacostal Temple Church v. Streaming Faith, LLC, No. 08-554, 2008 WL 
4279842, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2008). 
223 Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011). 
224 Id. at 740–41. 
225 For a discussion of the effect of “knowing assent” as a basis for analyzing the 
enforceability of contracts, see Warkentine, supra note 178. 
226 See supra notes 39–40 (listing a number of cases stating that clickwrap agreements 
are generally enforceable and that, because people should be aware by now that there are 
contracts associated with webpages, their use of the pages implies acceptance). 
227 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
228 Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1119, 1121–22 n.11 (1998). Easterbrook’s footnote for this statement cites Carnival 
Cruise, thus illustrating that Easterbrook saw the Rehnquist Court as left leaning; but more 
interestingly, the footnote adds: “see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th 
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In Carnival Cruise, the Court enforced a forum-selection clause in 
the fine print of a cruise line ticket that the consumers did not receive 
until weeks after entering the contract by booking the cruise.229 Of 
course, the Shutes family took the affirmative action of boarding the 
boat after the terms were available, but the contract to which the 
terms applied had already been formed.230 Although the Court 
suggested that the Shutes could have rescinded the contract after 
having access to the terms,231 the face of the ticket belied the scope of 
that remedy.232 According to the ticket terms, the Court then gave 
credence to a forum selection clause,233 and the Shutes were forced to 
litigate a personal injury claim in Florida, rather than their home state 
of Washington.234 
In the wake of Carnival Cruise, corporations have the power to 
select a forum for litigation, but, more relevant to our purposes, courts 
readily embrace mere implications of assent. Courts may now assume 
that a person means to assent based on the circumstances and 
common nature of the transaction,235 rather than requiring showing of 
an intention to agree based on the person’s actual affirmative action 
or manifestation.236 While inferences from affirmative manifestations 
cannot perfectly speak to the intent of the party, it is at least a more 
accurate portrayal of a person’s intentions than the existence of a 
disclaimer on a piece of paper in the person’s possession. 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 1997),” suggesting he sees the Seventh Circuit and himself as left leaning. Id. at 1122 
n.11. Surely that is heresy. 
229 Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595. 
230 Id.  
231 Id. 
232 Id. The majority does not discuss paragraph 16(a) of the ticket, which provides that 
“[t]he Carrier shall not be liable to make any refund to passengers in respect of . . . tickets 
wholly or partly not used by a passenger.” Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations 
and omissions in original). The Shutes likely did not receive the copy of the ticket until the 
right to cancel without a substantial penalty had passed. A nod is as good as a wink to a 
blind horse, and the opportunity for refund seems just as illusory. 
233 “Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by American courts. 
Many courts, federal and state, have declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that 
they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust the jurisdiction’ of 
the court.” Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (citation omitted); see 
also Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553, 555 (2012). 
234 Carnival, 499 U.S. at 588. 
235 See Preston & McCann, supra note 19, at 28–29. In the online context, courts that 
assume the legitimacy of browsewrap agreements do so primarily on the basis that assent 
is implied by the person continuing to use the website that contains a contract binding all 
users. See id. 
236 See Knapp, supra note 233, at 562. 
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The Carnival Cruise decision is “a prime exemplar of the so-called 
‘rolling’ contract” where “contract law is seemingly moving 
inexorably toward a state in which neither the presence nor the 
absence of actual consent has any real significance.”237 The Court 
declared that terms unknown at the time of contracting would be 
enforced as long as there was an opportunity to obtain a refund once 
the terms were known and the terms demonstrated “fundamental 
fairness.”238 But the Court’s scrutiny into fundamental fairness 
merely discussed the fact that Carnival Cruise Lines did not mean to 
“discourage” claims and it had a reasonable excuse for picking 
Florida as the forum: saving money.239 But if all corporate decisions 
could be legitimized with money-saving justifications, there would be 
arguably more serious costs to bear than the loss of protections in 
consumer transactions. 
In any event, these cases seem to be setting an ever-growing trend 
of accepting adhesion contracts across industries without batting an 
eye at the overreaching terms or overreaching nature of the 
transaction.240 As long as courts continue to accept increasingly 
ambiguous actions as evidence of assent or fail to allow 
unconscionability to do its job, unwary consumers will continue to get 
stuck by adhesion contracts without an anti-adhesive for use in 
combat. 
As the convenience of boilerplate terms and standard forms have 
won the day,241 the traditional policies of contract formation have 
been compromised. Consumers are helpless to combat the necessary 
evils of standard form contracting contemplated by the UCC 
drafters.242 If current courts are accepting these terms and these types 
of contracts on the basis that UCC drafters initially found them to be 
acceptable, then these courts are only looking at half the picture—the 
                                                     
237 Id. 
238 Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595. 
239 Id. 
240 See supra notes 39–40; see also Kaustuv M. Das, Forum-Selection Clauses in 
Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the “Reasonably Communicated” 
Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2002) (discussing adhesion contracts and their ever-
increasing acceptability in courts, particularly since many contracts have moved online).  
241 See Hillman, supra note 16, at 743 (“Despite lots of notoriety and spilled ink over 
the general issue of standard-form contracts, contract law has responded effectively to the 
problem by following Karl Llewellyn’s conception to enforce bargained-for terms and 
conscionable boilerplate provisions, while barring egregious terms.”). 
242 See supra Part IV. 
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half that does not include the back-up engine that justified allowing 
the contracts in the first place. 
VI 
LLEWELLYN, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, AND FEUDALISM, THEN AND 
NOW 
We agree that it is too late to turn back the tide of the twentieth 
century to accepting contracts of adhesion notwithstanding the pillars 
of freedom of contract.243 “It is not even profitable to spend ‘the 
energy of counsel, the money of clients and the time and analysis of 
judges’ in discussing the problems presented by contracts of adhesion 
. . . to proclaim that recovery is ‘contrary to the well settled principles 
of contract law.’”244 The economic benefits (or the political and 
economic power of stronger market players) overpower the purity of 
contract doctrine and the principles that gave weaker parties freedom 
to contract. Nonetheless, at some point economic benefits must not 
trump every principle of contract law, and the exercise of ultra-
authority by the powerful, repeat players in the market must be 
bounded just as the power of government must be bounded. 
What is well overdue is a return to the values expressed by Karl 
Llewellyn that surrounded and balanced the acceptance of adhesion 
form contracts. Llewellyn encouraged judges to consider fairness and 
morality in law. He and other Realists only ask that the judge make 
explicit the grounds for the decision and substantiate the decision with 
logic.245 Random displays of discretion can be contained in doctrinal 
conceptions such as unconscionability. “‘Reason’ in law . . . implies 
the use of Reason in choosing premises which have a reason, and the 
use of Reason in judging the reasonableness of any outcome or 
goal.”246 
Llewellyn advocated judicial decisions reaching “right” and just 
conclusions, but not in response to the particular sympathies in a 
particular case,247 or transitory conditions.248 Rather results should 
                                                     
243 Kessler, supra note 18, at 629. 
244 Id. at 638 (quoting William O. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of 
Risk I, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 594 (1929)). 
245 See, e.g., RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 27 (1961). 
246 Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 
224, 235-36 (1942) (emphasis in original).  
247 What Llewellyn calls “fireside equities.” See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE 
LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 79 (Michael Ansaldi trans., Paul Gewirtz ed. 1989). 
248 LLEWELLYN, TRADITION, supra note 130, at 121. 
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change as a result of “situation sense,”249 loosely meaning an 
understanding of policies on a larger scale rather than mechanical 
application of legal rules. Reading Llewellyn makes clear that he 
would not have approved of mechanical application of economic 
principles either. Llewellyn respected social science and judicial 
understanding of real, lived human behavior,250 a consideration 
sometimes missed in economic science. 
Llewellyn accepted the value of predictability and precedent, but 
he balanced that with an understanding that law must change to meet 
new circumstances. He urged courts to acknowledge that law must 
evolve and develop rather than hide development under a rubric of 
applying existing precedents.251 His jurisprudence would recognize 
that, especially in the online context, as discussed in Part I, the values 
of economic efficiency, predictability, and certainty need to be 
reassessed and rebalanced with the need for policing abuses. 
In an article touting the value of neoclassicists, Professor Murray 
describes a Llewellian approach to contract law’s fall to the law and 
economic regime.252 Although it uses far too many labels for our 
taste, we agree with his conclusion: 
Neoclassicists do not deny the imperfections of the current system 
and judicial vision. Nor do they deny the potential contributions of 
the relationists, empiricists and economists. The insuperable 
obstacles are their insistence that they have discovered unitary truth, 
their corresponding rejection of on-going neoclassical theory that 
prevails in the real world, and their failure to provide even hints of 
functional substitutes in an ambience of practical judicial reasoning. 
. . . Llewellyn’s aspiration of a more decent, conscionable, good 
faith contracts society is necessarily a work in progress. . . . [I]t is 
not enough to reject a mandate such as unconscionability, good 
faith or other Llewellynesque standards or “leeways” as fatally 
vague. . . . Whatever deficiencies lie in the vagaries of Llewellyn’s 
efforts, there can be no reasonable doubt about his underlying 
purpose.253 
                                                     
249 Karl Llewellyn, On the Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
RECORD, 1960, at 3 (reprinted in HAYMAN, LEVIT & DELGADO, supra note 126, at 215). 
250 WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 22 
(1973). 
251 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
252 John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 869 (2002). 
253 Id. at 913–14. 
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A return to feudalism, at least in the adhesive contract and 
cyberspace arena, is a realistic metaphor.254 The feudal system 
blossomed because the functional limitations on the king mandated 
the delegation to sub-units of military and political responsibility to 
combat invasion and crime.255 As the lords swore fealty and made 
specific oaths, the king granted powerful and expansive benefits to his 
lords.256 
Contracts of adhesion mirror the feudal system, especially online. 
The court system and the power of government to enforce judgments 
is the king, and drafters of adhesion contracts are the lords. Courts 
grant benefits upon drafters to facilitate large-scale consumer 
contracting. However, courts originally pronounced limitations, much 
like feudal oaths. Further, like the idea of fealty, unconscionability 
was meant to limit the free rein of drafters as they began exercising 
this new power. Additionally, the dynamics of the relationship 
between consumer and commercial actor, especially in conjunction 
with online contracting, is not dissimilar to a feudal manor.257 
With online adhesive contracts, this return to feudalism metaphor 
suggests that corporate lords do not automatically protect consumer 
serfs and may actually be driven to exploit them.258 The feudal 
system’s growth led to the expansion of discretion and power for the 
manorial lords as the king became further removed from his 
subjects.259 Similarly, as the use and enforcement of adhesive 
contracts expands, the corporate lords’ drafters have seen and will 
continue to see an expansion of discretion and power unless courts 
begin limiting them. Simply, the acceptance of online adhesive 
contracts with little intervention or scrutiny by the courts permits the 
drafters to engage in serf exploitation. 
                                                     
254 See Yen, supra note 15. 
255 Id. at 1232–34 (citing MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 3–39 (L.A. Manyon trans., 
1961)); North & Thomas, supra note 46, at 782 (explaining the economic system of the 
manorial system and the issues the system combated such as war, labor needs, and 
protection for the labor force). 
256 Yen, supra note 15, at 1233; Lazarus, supra note 46, at 1746 n.58 (discussing the 
typical services of vassals or manorial lords owed to their liege lords). 
257 See supra Part II. The feudal system is premised on aggregated, similar, and 
powerful lords who are able to exploit their serfs. 
258 See Yen, supra note 15, at 1256. 
259 Id. at 1234 (“[T]he subdivision and transfer of fiefs to inferior vassals led to the 
fragmentation of government. The association of land with right and authority to govern 
meant that lords gave away some of their power whenever they granted land to their 
vassals. Over time, this practice took significant power from the king . . . and vested it in 
local lords who often administered justice over their subjects with relative impunity.”). 
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While mantras such as “return to feudalism” seem overdramatic, 
the questions about power distribution are real and must be the 
subject of serious reflection, especially as we embrace the Internet. 
The Electronic Freedom Foundation and a plethora of courtiers have 
engaged in ideological warfare to protect the notion that the Internet 
is the liberation of the common geek over political tyrannies.260 But 
their focus on government as the enemy may be misplaced. 
“Netizens,” or individuals who actively use the Internet, are rightfully 
entitled to contract for reasonable protection of their code, creativity, 
and efforts in building a thriving digital marketplace. Unfortunately, 
the temptation is to spread beyond such protection to impose hidden 
contractual provisions that range from imbalanced to draconian, and 
to cover issues far afield from licensing rights. The regular imposition 
of such terms through methods that hide the risks, and the terms 
themselves, should raise serious alarm. Essentially, adhesive contracts 
are threatening to swallow traditional contract principles. 
CONCLUSION 
As means of contracting continue to advance and the economic 
pressures mount, the law in this area will also evolve with or without 
our awareness. With the advent of clickwrap and browsewrap 
formation and the ability to conceal the breadth and depth of terms 
that would be visible to a party handed a form in the real world, 
commentators are struggling to find a cohesive and workable 
stratagem for imposing some limits on their excesses. The doctrines 
of unconscionability and knowing assent have been unsuccessful at 
the task. 
In 1953 Albert A. Ehrenzweig observed that: 
 At the end of the last century the courts made the law do its 
share in protecting and encouraging our fast-growing industry and 
commerce. . . . And when the hazards of mechanized trade and 
commerce began to harm thousands of innocent bystanders by 
monopolistic pressures, the temper of the time considered this [] an 
inevitable sacrifice to freedom and progress, and the law followed 
suit by subjecting the adherent who signed on the dotted line to a 
“contract” law of meeting minds.261 
                                                     
260 For a discussion of the Electronic Freedom Foundation, John Barlow’s (Grateful 
Dead) Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, and the attitudes of Internet 
Frontiersmen generally, see Preston, Internet and Pornography, supra note 14. 
261 Ehrenzweig, supra note 6, at 1089. 
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Although Ehrenzweig was referring to the end of the nineteenth 
century, his comments apply just as well to the twentieth century in 
which such trends are magnified. Ehrenzweig hoped that enforcement 
of adhesion contracts would not pass the line of reason. He declared: 
“No longer will the law purport to protect a freedom to impose 
restraints on oneself which, ‘in the hands of the weak and necessitous, 
defeats the very end of liberty.’”262 While time has shown that his 
attempt to draw a line in 1953 was fruitless, surely the advent of 
browsewraps has now pushed us again to such a demand. 
Adhesive online contracts, in particular, have become effective 
instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial 
overlords. This spectacle is all the more fascinating considering that it 
was contract ideology that successfully tore down the last vestiges of 
a feudal order a hundred years ago.263 An 1895 treatise on medieval 
English law sums up the problem of contract and feudalism nicely: 
“[T]he law of contract threatened to swallow up all public law. . . . If 
there is to be any law at all, contract must be taught to know its 
place.”264 
While we were sleeping, the noble objects of contract law were 
being lost. Freedom of contract envisioned the choice of serfs to 
define their own commitments, rather than be subject to the largely 
unfettered pronouncements of the powerful lord to which serfs were 
subject by status. In the digital age, our legal system allows powerful 
parties to stipulate terms on every aspect of a person’s online activity 
without even the requirement of clear notice.  Have we lost the ideals 
of a jurisprudence appalled by Lochner v. New York265 and the 
enforcement of contracts that enslaved bakers to work weeks in 
excess of sixty hours because they had no other options for 
employment? 
The pendulum has swung wide in favor of online contracts and 
crafty lawyers who have inserted surprisingly harsh and unexpected 
terms because the length and complexity of online contracts ensure 
they will not be read even if they can be found. Courts must again 
learn to see the circumstances by which these contracts are imposed, 
                                                     
262 Id. (quoting Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 484 (1909)). 
263 Kessler, supra note 18, at 640–41. The case Kessler alludes to is Priestly v. Fowler, 
(1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex.). Kessler’s work incorporates Roscoe Pound’s prediction 
of the imperialism of powerful commercial interests. See Roscoe Pound, The New 
Feudalism, 16 A.B.A. J. 553, 554 (1930). 
264 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 230 (1895). 
265 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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consider the extent to which they threaten fundamental principles of 
contract law, and exert the restraints necessary to maintain some 
balance of power. 
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